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AUDITORS' LIABILITY - ADOPTION OF A REASONABLE
FORESEEABILITY STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law liability1 of auditors to third party users of negli-
gently audited2 financial statements is currently in a state of transition.
1. Auditors' liability has been extensively discussed in numerous law review articles. See,
e.g., Besser, Privity? - An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third
Parties, 7 Sa'roN HALL L. REv. 507 (1976); Burton, The Developing Role of the Indepen-
dent Auditor in Corporate Governance, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 813 (1981); Dondanville, De-
fending Accountants' Liability: Trends and Implications, 15 FORUM 173 (1979); Fiflis, Cur-
rent Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VANM. L. REv. 31
(1975); Griffin, The Beleaguered Accountants: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A. J. 759
(1976); Gromley, Accountants' Professional Liability - A Ten Year Review, 29 Bus. LAW.
1205 (1974); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Accountants' Liability and Responsibility: Securi-
ties, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 247 (1980); Kastoris, Accountants'
Third Party Liability - How Far Do We Go?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1967); Marinelli,
The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third Parties, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
113 (1971); Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 838 (1977); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants'
Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAuL L. REV. 56 (1968); Stern, Accountants' Liability to
Third Parties, 17 CLE.-MAR. L. REV. 490 (1968); Wiener, Common Law Liability of the
Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233
(1983); Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 588 (1972); Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered
Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REv. 675 (1971).
2. This comment is limited to an auditor's third party liability for negligence in auditing
financial statements. For a discussion of an auditor's liability in other contexts, see Note,
Accountants' Liability for Compilation and Review Engagements, 60 Tax. L. REv. 759
(1982).
The objective of an audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing stan-
dards (GAAS) "is to form an opinion on whether the financial statements present fairly
financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial position in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP] consistently applied." AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AccouNTANTs, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, AU § 327.05 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as AICPA]. See also A. ARENS & J. LOEBEECKE, AuDITING: AN INTEGRATED AP-
PROACH 3 (2d ed. 1980). An auditor is negligent when he fails to comply with GAAS. Escott
v. Bar Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gruenbaum & Steinberg,
Accountants' Liability and Responsibility: Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 LoY.
L.A.L. REV. 247, 257-61 (1980).
GAAS requires professional expertise, proper auditing procedures, and proper reporting,
as follows:
General Standards
1. The examination is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate
technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is
to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the examination
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For years, on the basis of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, auditors success-
fully raised a lack of privity of contract with the plaintiff as a defense in
negligence actions. Starting in the late 1960's, however, courts began to
abandon the privity defense in favor of liability limited to actually fore-
seen third parties or foreseeable classes of financial statement users.4 Two
recent cases manifesting the trend toward expanded auditors' liability
held for the first time that negligent auditors can be liable to all reasona-
bly foreseeable users.5
This comment will not only trace the evolution of auditors' liability for
negligently audited financial statements, but will also examine the ration-
ale supporting the adoption of a reasonable foreseeability standard' and
postulate potential problems created by that standard.7
and the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly
supervised.
2. There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control as a
basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant extent of the
tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, ob-
servation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion re-
garding the financial statements under examination.
Standards of Reporting
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in accor-
dance with generally accepted accounting principles.
2. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently observed
in the current period in relation to the preceding period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as reason-
ably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
4. The report shall contain an expression of opinion regarding the financial state-
ments, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be ex-
pressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, the reasons therefor should be
stated. In all cases where an auditor's name is associated with financial statements,
the report should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's ex-
amination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.
AICPA, supra, at AU § 150.02. "Auditing standards differ from auditing procedures in that
'procedures' relate to acts to be performed, whereas 'standards' deal with measures of the
quality of the performance of those acts and the objectives to be attained by use of the
procedures undertaken." Id. at AU § 150.01.
Throughout this comment, "accountant" will be used interchangeably with "auditor."
3. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See infra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 49-76 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF Ultramares
A. A Citadel of Privity Preserved
Fifteen years after writing the opinion which abolished the privity de-
fense in actions against negligent manufacturers, s Judge Cardozo, in Ul-
tramares Corp. v. Touche,9 upheld the privity defense in actions by third
parties against negligent auditors.10 In Ultramares, an auditor was em-
ployed to prepare and certify a balance sheet, knowing that in the usual
course of business the balance sheet would be shown "to banks, creditors,
stockholders, purchasers, or sellers, according to the needs of the occa-
sion, as the basis of financial dealings." 1 Although the audit was negli-
gently conducted,"2 a creditor who relied on the balance sheet to make
loans to the client was denied recovery because he was not in privity of
contract with the auditor.1
3
The New York Court of Appeals had to reconcile its opinion in Ul-
tramares with its previous products liability decisions 4 and with its deci-
sion in Glanzer v. Shepard.15 Distinguishing the products liability cases
from a case concerning a negligently performed audit posed little diffi-
culty, as the former involved serious bodily harm to individuals while the
latter involved an injury only to property interests.16 Distinguishing
Glanzer from the instant case was, however, a more arduous task in light
of various factual similarities.
8. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See Besser, Priv-
ity? - An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SETON
HALL L. REv. 507, 508 nn.15-17 (1976) (discussing the development of the privity doctrine).
9. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
10. Actions by non-client third parties against the auditor should be distinguished from
actions by the client. The auditor can be held liable to the client for his negligence based
upon either tort or contract theories. Recovery can be obtained for any pecuniary losses. See
Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REv. 797
(1959); see also A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 2, at 81.
11. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at _, 174 N.E. at 442.
12. Id. at _, 174 N.E. at 443.
13. Id. at 174 N.E. at 442-48. Numerous cases have upheld the privity requirement.
See, e.g., Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013, (5th Cir. 1976) (applying
Florida law); Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974) (applying Kansas
law); Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying Colo-
rado law); Shofstall v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Investment
Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. App. 1968), cert. dismissed, 216 So. 2d 748
(Fla. 1969); Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. App. 1968); MacNerland
v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973); Dworman v. Lee, 83 A.D.2d 507, 441
N.Y.S.2d 90 (1981).
14. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at , 174 N.E. at 445 (discussing MacPherson v. Buick Mo-
tor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) and H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247
N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928)).
15. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
16. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at -, 174 N.E. at 445.
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In Glanzer, the defendant was a public weigher. At the request of a
bean vendor, the defendant weighed the goods to be sold and furnished a
weight certificate to the purchaser. The certificate was incorrect, resulting
in an overpayment to the vendor. The purchaser successfully sued the
weigher for his economic loss, despite the lack of privity of contract. 17
Rather than follow Glanzer, where the distinction between physical
and economic injury was treated as insignificant,' Cardozo distinguished
it from Ultramares on the basis of the actual foreseeability of the use by
the injured third party. He noted that
the service rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily
for the information of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the
contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case
at hand, the service was primarily for the benefit of the ... [client], a con-
venient instrumentality for use in the development of the business, and only
incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom... [the client] and
his associates might exhibit it thereafter.' 9
Ultimately, however, Cardozo's refusal to find the auditor liable in the
absence of privity was premised on a fear that "[i]f liability for negligence
exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or for-
gery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an in-
determinate class."120 The indefiniteness of the'liability and the possible
extremes to which it could be carried caused Cardozo to "doubt whether a
flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences."
2
'
Cardozo cited two additional justifications for the privity requirement.
First, he felt that liability without privity would "so expand the field of
liability for negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite, cotermi-
17. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
18. See generally Besser, supra note 8, at 512 n.19. The distinction between bodily harm
and economic loss is significant, however, to the extent that it serves as an underlying rea-
son for courts to seek some method of limiting liability. Thus, the distinction was drawn in
Ultramares. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at -, 174 N.E. at 445; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
19. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at -, 174 N.E. at 446. Cardozo also sought support for the
distinction in third party beneficiary principles of contract law. He pointed out that
[s]omething more must then appear than an intention that the promise shall redound
to the benefit of the public or to that of a class of indefinite extension. The promise
must be such as to "bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation directly to
the individual members of the public if the benefit is lost."
Id. at -, 174 N.E. at 445 (quoting H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160,
164, 159 N.E. 896, 897 (1928)).
20. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at -, 174 N.E. at 444.
21. Id.
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nous with that of liability for fraud. '22 Second, he was concerned that
creation of a duty to the third party would eventually lead to recovery by
the third party for negligence in situations where the auditor would not
have been liable to the client.
23
B. A Breach in the Citadel: Glanzer and the Restatement
As courts started to seek ways of circumventing the strictures of the
privity doctrine as applied to negligent auditors,24 they seized upon both
the rationale of the Glanzer" case and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts26 to bolster their opinions. Glanzer was cited to support a cause of
action against an auditor by an actually foreseen third party, while the
Restatement was cited to support actions by foreseeable classes of
financial statement users.27
The Rhode Island Federal District Court, in Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levin,2s was the first post-Ultramares court to uphold an ordinary negli-
gence action against an auditor by a non-client third party.29 In Rusch, a
creditor requested certified financial statements from a corporation to as-
sess the company's financial well-being. In reliance on financial state-
22. Id. at -... , 174 N.E. at 447. Although Cardozo recognized that negligence may serve
as a basis for inferring fraud, he held that "negligence alone is not a substitute for fraud."
Id. An auditor would be liable to a third party for fraud. Id. at , 174 N.E. at 444.
23. Id. at - , 174 N.E. at 448. Cardozo stated:
Negligence, moreover, will have one standard when viewed in relation to the em-
ployer, and another and at times a stricter standard when viewed in relation to the
public. Explanations that might seem plausible, omissions that might be reasonable,
if the duty is confined to the employer, conducting a business that presumably at
least is not a fraud upon his creditors, might wear another aspect if an independent
duty to be suspicious even of one's principal is owing to investors.
Id.
24. Until the 1960's, courts seemed to apply the privity doctrine in all negligence actions
against auditors. Besser, supra note 8, at 517.
25. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). The Restatement finds the negligent
auditor liable when loss is suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance
he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it;
and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
Id.
27. Besser, supra note 8, at 522 (discussing the tentative draft); see also Wiener, Common
Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN'
DIEGo L. REV. 233, 248 (1983). Both Glanzer and the Restatement can be seen as requiring
the audit to be for the "primary benefit" of a third party, either specifically or as a member
of a limited group. Id. See also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, _ , 461 A.2d 138,
145 (1983).
28. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
29. Besser, supra note 8, at 518-20.
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ments prepared by the defendant auditor indicating the solvency of the
corporation, the creditor loaned the corporation $337,000. The corpora-
tion was actually insolvent, however, and went into receivership.3 0 After
criticizing the rationale of Ultramares,3 ' the court drew an analogy to
Glanzer in order to allow the non-privity plaintiff's cause of action.3 2 In
doing so, the court ruled "that an accountant should be liable in negli-
gence for careless financial misrepresentations relied upon by actually
foreseen and limited classes of persons."3 The court, however, left unan-
swered "the question of whether an accountant's liability for negligent
misrepresentation ought to extend to the full limits of foreseeability." 4
Subsequent to Rusch, several other courts have stated that auditors can
be held liable to actually foreseen third party users of financial state-
ments.3 5 Significantly, the New York Court of Appeals has followed this
approach. In White v. Guarente,30 it carefully distinguished Ultramares
in order to find that auditors can be found liable to members "of a settled
and particularized class."13 7 In White, the auditor was engaged by a lim-
30. Rusch Factors, Inc., 284 F. Supp. at 86-87.
31. The court expressed its doubt about the rationale of Ultramares in a series of rhetori-
cal questions:
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an
accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed
and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost
of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the
entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cau-
tionary techniques of the accounting profession?
Id. at 91.
32. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of Glanzer. The Rusch
court also reviewed the provisions of the tentative draft of § 552 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.
33. Rusch Factors, Inc., 284 F. Supp. at 93. The holding, although ostensibly based on
Glanzer, actually follows the Restatement by finding a cause of action for a foreseen class
rather than one limited to an actually foreseen third party.
34. Rusch Factors, Inc., 284 F. Supp. at 93.
35. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Ja-
cobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Aluma
Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
Other cases, however, have held strictly to the privity requirement of Ultramares. See
supra note 13.
36. 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).
37. Id. at -, 372 N.E.2d at 320, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 479. Thus, the New York court can be
seen as applying the "actual foreseeability" of Glanzer, see supra text accompanying note
19 to the members of a foreseeable class. The court stressed the fact that this case "did not
involve prospective limited partners, unknown at the time and who might be induced to
join, but rather actual limited partners, fixed and determined." Id. at -, 372 N.E.2d at
318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477. This contrasts with the Restatement approach which seems to
allow liability to a member of a foreseeable class, whether the specific class member is fore-
seeable or not. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; see also Besser, supra note 8,
at 524-28 (discussing the tentative draft of § 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
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ited partnership to audit the partnership books and prepare its tax re-
turns. A malpractice claim, brought by a limited partner, asserted that
the auditor negligently failed to comment on the withdrawal from the
partnership of a major portion of the general partners' investment.38 The
court characterized the limited partners as "a known group possessed of
vested rights, marked by a definable limit and made up of certain compo-
nents." 9 The court reasoned that "[i]n such circumstances, . . . duty is
imposed by law and it is not necessary to state the duty in terms of con-
tract or privity."4 °
C. The Citadel Crumbles
Despite repeated criticisms of the specialized treatment that defendant
auditors were receiving under Ultramares, Glanzer, and the Restate-
ment,41 it was not until 1983, fifteen years after Rusch, that a broad
"foreseeable reliance" standard was applied to auditors' negligence by an
American court.42 Coincidentally, it was in a suit against the partners of
Touche Ross & Co. that the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an au-
ditor "has a duty to all those whom that auditor should reasonably fore-
see as recipients from the company of the statements for its proper busi-
ness purposes. . .. -43 Less than a month later, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that "[1]iability will be imposed on . . accountants for the
foreseeable injuries resulting from their negligent acts . . .44
In Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212
(1982), a case like White in that it involved a negligence suit by limited partners against the
partnership's auditor, the Ohio Supreme Court held "that an accountant may be held liable
by a third party for professional negligence when that third party is a member of a limited
class whose reliance on the accountant's representation is specifically foreseen." Id. at _
436 N.E.2d at 215. It thus failed to subscribe to the view espoused in White, even though it
cited that case with approval.
38. White, 43 N.Y.2d at .-. , 372 N.E.2d at 317-18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
39. Id. at -_, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
40. Id. at , 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
41. See, e.g., Besser, supra note 8, at 528-42; Wiener, supra note 27, at 249-60; see also
Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third Parties, 23 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 113 (1971); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HAZv. L.
REv. 372 (1939); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liabil-
ity to the Public, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 56 (1968).
42. At least one English case had endorsed this standard prior to its adoption by an
American court. JEB Fasteners Ltd. v. Marks, Bloom & Co., [1981] 3 All E.R. 289, 296.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d
154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982), indicated a willingness to find negligent auditors liable "to any
third person to whom they understand the report will be shown for business purposes." Id.
at - 436 N.E.2d at 215. However, the court ultimately followed the Restatement ap-
proach by allowing liability to "a member of a limited class whose reliance on the account-
ant's representation is specifically foreseen." Id.
43. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, -, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983).
44. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, -, 335 N.W.2d 361,
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The New Jersey case, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,45 involved audits of
the financial statements of Giant Stores Corporation (Giant), a publicly
traded company which was required to file audited financial statements
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Touche Ross & Co. con-
ducted the audits from 1969 through 1972. During 1971, Giant negotiated
to acquire the plaintiffs' business in exchange for stock in Giant. The
stock later became worthless when it was discovered that Giant had
fraudulently overstated its assets and understated its accounts payable.
The plaintiffs sued the Touche Ross partners for negligence, asserting
that they relied upon the audited financial statements in selling their
business.4 6
The Wisconsin case, Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,4
involved loans made by Citizens based on financial statements which
Timm had prepared for its client. During a subsequent audit, errors in
the prior year's financial statements were discovered. Citizens called its
loans after being informed of the errors, sending Timm's client into re-
ceivership. Citizens then sued Timm for negligence, seeking the uncol-
lected balance of the loans.
48
The question of whether an auditor can be held liable for negligence in
the absence of privity of contract was one of first impression in both New
Jersey49 and Wisconsin. In reaching their decisions, the courts analyzed
each of the options - duty to only primary beneficiaries (i.e., those in
privity with the auditor or those known to be "beneficiaries at the time of
the auditor's undertaking"51 ); duty to an intended class of beneficiaries
under the Restatement approach; or duty "to those whom the auditor
should reasonably foresee as recipients from the company of the financial
statements for authorized business purposes. "52
The Wisconsin court rejected the privity approach because "[u]nless
liability is imposed, third parties who rely upon the accuracy of the
financial statements will not be protected. Unless an accountant can be
held liable to a relying third party, this negligence will go undeterred.""3
The prevention of increases in the general public's cost of credit and the
auditor's ability to spread the risk through insurance were also cited as
366 (1983). Rosenblum was decided on June 9, 1983, while Citizens State Bank was decided
on July 1, 1983.
45. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
46. Id. at - , 461 A.2d at 140-41.
47. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
48. Id. at - , 335 N.W.2d at 362.
49. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at -, 461 A.2d at 144.
50. Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at - , 335 N.W.2d at 364.
51. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at -, 461 A.2d at 142.
52. Id.
53. Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at - , 335 N.W.2d at 365 (footnote omitted).
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additional polity grounds for the rejection of privity5 4 The Restatement
approach of "limiting liability to certain third parties" was viewed in
Wisconsin as "too restrictive" in light of Wisconsin's negligence law that
"a tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act ex-
cept as those consequences are limited by policy factors." 55
The New Jersey court's analysis proceeded on two prongs. First, the
court characterized Ultramares, Glanzer, and the Restatement as each
requiring some "relationship between the relying third party and the au-
ditor." 56 The necessity for that relationship was rejected by analogizing
products liability cases to the negligent misrepresentations of an audi-
tor.5 7 The court held that "[u]nless some policy considerations warrant
otherwise, privity should not be, and is not, a salutory predicate to pre-
vent recovery. Generally, within the outer limits fixed by the court as a
matter of law, the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the negligent
act define the duty and should be actionable." 8 The court then advanced
to the second part of its analysis, assessing the policy considerations in-
volved in determining the scope of an auditor's duty. 9 Among the factors
considered to be important were the following:
- the increased regular use of financial statements by third parties;6
- the existence of auditors' liability to investors under the securities
laws;6
1
54. Id. The Wisconsin court was apparently relying on Rusch. See supra note 31.
55. Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at -, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
56. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at _, 461 A.2d at 145.
57. Id. at _ 461 A.2d at 142-47. The analogy was summarized succinctly by the court
when it said: "The maker of the product and the person making a written representation
with intent that it be relied upon are, respectively, impliedly holding out that the product is
reasonably fit, suitable and safe and that the representation is reasonably sufficient, suitable
and accurate." Id. at -, 461 A.2d at 147.
58. Id. at _ , 461 A.2d at 145.
59. "Whether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness." Id. at .-, 461 A.2d at
147 (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293
(1962)). The court also referred to the balancing approach of Harper and James. H. Rosen-
blum, Inc., 93 N.J. at -, 461 A.2d at 147. Under that approach to duty analysis, the
following factors are considered:
[T]he burden [that the suggested duty] would put on the defendant's activity; the
extent to which the risk is one normally incident to that activity; the risk and the
burden to plaintiff; the respective availability and cost of insurance to the two par-
ties; the prevalence of insurance in fact; the desirability and effectiveness of putting
the pressure to insure on one rather than the other, and the like.
Id. (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMS, LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1052 (1956)).
60. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at _, 461 A.2d at 149.
61. Id. at -, 461 A.2d at 151. Generally, privity is not required for auditors to be held
liable to third parties under the securities laws. Id. See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note
2, at 248-94; see also Gruenbaum, The SEC's Use of Rule 2(e) to Discipline Accountants
and Other Professionals, 56 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 820 (1981); Karmel, A Delicate Assignment:
The Regulation of Accountants by the SEC, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 959 (1981).
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- the availability of malpractice insurance for auditors; 2
- the possibility that a broad duty will result in audits of a higher
quality;13
- the ability of the auditor to pass the increased audit and insurance
costs through to the client and its customers;6
- the possibility of indemnification or contribution from the client or its
employees;
6 5
- the ability of the auditor to limit the scope of his engagement or dis-
claim any opinion on the financial statements;66 and
- the desire to compensate the injured.6 7
Although both courts concluded that auditors can be held liable to rea-
sonably foreseeable third party financial statement users,6 there are dif-
ferences between the two holdings. In Rosenblum, the New Jersey court
performed a balancing test that legally defined the scope of an auditor's
62. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at _ 461 A.2d at 151.
63. Id. at -, 461 A.2d at 152. But see Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An
Ill-Considered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675, 685-98 (1971) (the writer ar-
gues that the incremental increase in financial statement quality is not worth the increased
audit costs resulting from a broadened scope of liability).
64. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at -, 461 A.2d at 152.
65. Id. The court, however, seems to ignore the fact that the auditor may be the only
solvent party left. Griffin, The Beleaguered Accountants: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62
A.B.A. J. 759, 760-61 (1976).
66. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at _, 461 A.2d at 152.
The court felt that auditors "could in some circumstances, such as when auditing a pri-
vately owned company, expressly limit in their certificates the persons or class of persons
who would be entitled to rely upon the audit." Id. However, this option is not currently
available to an auditor under the prescribed professional standards. An example of a stan-
dard auditor's report on comparative financial statements is as follows:
We have examined the balance sheets of ABC Company as of [at] December 31, 19X2
and 19X1, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and changes in
financial position for the years then ended. Our examinations were made in accor-
dance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included such
tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered
necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the financial
position of ABC Company as of [at] December 31, 19X2 and 19X1, and the results of
its operations and the changes in its financial position for the years then ended, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent
basis.
AICPA, supra note 2, at AU § 505.03.
See Note, supra note 2 (discussing limited scope engagements); see also Davison, Audi-
tors' Liability to Third Parties for Negligence, 12 AccT. & Bus. RESEARCH 257 (1982) (con-
cluding that auditors should be quicker to disclaim or issue an adverse opinion).
67. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at _, 461 A.2d at 152.
68. Id. at - , 461 A.2d at 145, 153; Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at -, 335
N.W.2d at 366.
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duty as including a duty to reasonably foreseeable financial statement
users.6  The Wisconsin court, on the other hand, requires a balancing of
policy factors in each case to determine if a particular plaintiff falls
within the scope of an auditor's duty.70 The factors for withholding liabil-
ity are:
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too
wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or
(3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence
should have brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery
would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or (5)
because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraud-
ulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no
sensible or just stopping point.7 1
Arguably, the difference between the approaches is only in semantics.7 2
More significantly, the New Jersey court placed a limitation on the au-
ditor's duty. The court, while not calling it a limitation, described the
application of its holding:
The principle that we have adopted applies by its terms only to those fore-
seeable users who receive the audited statements from the business entity
for a proper business purpose to influence a business decision of the user,
the audit having been made for that business entity. Thus, for example, an
institutional investor or portfolio manager who does not obtain audited
statements from the company would not come within the stated principle.75
69. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at - 461 A.2d at 145. The court concluded that
"[w]hen the independent auditor furnishes an opinion with no limitation in the certificate as
to whom the company may disseminate the financial statements, he has a duty to all those
whom that auditor should reasonably foresee as recipients ...... Id. at , 461 A.2d at
153.
70. Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at , 335 N.W.2d at 366.
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. For the difference to be merely semantic, the New Jersey courts would need to ana-
lyze similar policy factors in determining whether a particular plaintiff was foreseeable.
Foreseeability of harm is of concern in determining proximate causation. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 254-60 (4th ed. 1971). While it is a question for the
jury, id. § 45, it is also of concern to the court in determining whether or not a duty extends
to a particular plaintiff. Id. §§ 42, 43, 45. Notably, the factors cited by the Wisconsin court
cover both foreseeability and social policy concerns, see supra text accompanying note 71,
thus providing flexibility and comporting with the Harper and James conception of balanc-
ing. See Besser, supra note 8, at 528-35.
To avoid confusion over the duty analysis, it has been suggested that the question should
be analyzed in terms of "whether there should be liability." Wiener, supra note 27, at 254.
To answer this question, the courts would balance the social costs of recovery by the injured
plaintiff against those of non-recovery. When recovery is favored, non-liability would be
"justified only if there is some external social cause not accounted for in the usual cost
balancing system." Id. at 254-55.
73. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at , 461 A.2d at 153.
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Citizens did not contain such a limitation. It is possible that the New
Jersey court only meant to reemphasize the plaintiff's need to establish a
prima facie negligence cause of action, including reliance on the financial
statements, in order to recover.7 4 However, the court required "[t]he
plaintiffs . . . to establish that they received the audited statements from
the company pursuant to a proper company purpose. . . . 15 It is unclear
why this is necessary for a negligence cause of action. 6 Perhaps it is an
unarticulated effort by the court to provide additional protection for the
auditor from fraudulent claims.
III. AFTER Ultramares
A. A Possible Middle Ground
Despite the compulsion to achieve a logical symmetry in the law by
finding a duty running from the auditor to the reasonably foreseeable
financial statement user, the same uneasiness over the possible breadth of
liability that plagued Cardozo over fifty years ago still haunts the courts.
This fact may be at the root of the limitation in Rosenblum and is cer-
tainly one reason why courts clung to the privity defense for a long period
of time after its abolition in other contexts.7 Such a concern has been
recognized by the Supreme Court in actions under the securities laws:
While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the elimina-
tion of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not the first court
to express concern that the inexorable broadening of this class of plaintiff
who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than
good.78
Because of the continued fear of indefinite liability if a reasonable fore-
seeability standard is accepted, some courts, like the Rosenblum court,
may look to limiting devices other than privity.
The difficulty of proving the plaintiff's prima facie case of negligence is
itself a "built-in" limiting device.7 9 The plaintiff must establish that he
74. This interpretation is supported by the court's statement that "stockholders who pur-
chased the stock after a negligent audit [would not] be covered" unless "the necessary con-
ditions precedent" had been satisfied. Id.
75. Id. at -, 461 A.2d at 152.
76. Establishing the auditor's negligence under the reasonable foreseeability approach
should not differ from any other negligent misrepresentation action. Therefore, the plaintiff
must show justifiable reliance, proximate causation, duty, negligence, and damages. Besser,
supra note 8, at 537-41.
77. Id. at 528-29.
78. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747-48 (1975), quoted in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1975). These cases limited the scope of ac-
tions under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by requiring an actual purchase
or sale of a security by the plaintiff and by requiring scienter on the part of the defendant.
79. H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at , 461 A.2d at 152; Besser, supra note 8, at 537-41.
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justifiably relied on a material misstatement or omission in the audited
financial statements,"0 that the auditor was negligent,"" and that the neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.82 Furthermore,
given the complex nature of audits of intricate modern business transac-
tions, expensive ihvestigations and expert testimony must frequently be
utilized in order to show a deviation from professional standards. 3
The securities laws are a source of procedural restrictions which might
be employed to limit baseless claims." Examples of such restrictions in-
clude requiring the plaintiff to post a bond for costs (including attorney
fees), assessing costs, and shortening statutes of limitations. 5 Other sug-
gested limiting devices are insurance for investors covering losses from
management fraud and recovery ceilings set at a percentage of the audi-
tor's fees.88
B. Incidental Results of the Foreseeability Standard
The adoption of the reasonable foreseeability standard may have sev-
eral undesirable consequences. First, because of the increase in potential
liability, auditors will find it necessary to spend more time on their audits
in order to ensure against mistakes and oversights.87 Second, the expected
increase in audit and auditor insurance costs which will be passed on to
the clients"8 may force some clients, such as new, small, or nearly bank-
rupt businesses, to forego audits in favor of less expensive accounting ser-
vices.19 If this happens, the quality of disclosure and the related level of
protection will deteriorate.8 0 Third, situations may arise in which contrib-
utory negligence bars the recovery of a client but not that of a "relying"
third party. This concern, which parallels Cardozo's fear that an auditor
might be held liable to a third party for negligence when there would
have been no liability to the client,91 manifested itself in the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seid-
80. W. PROSSER, supra note 72, § 108.
81. Id. §§ 30, 41-45.
82. Id. §§ 30, 37-40.
83. Besser, supra note 8, at 539-41; see Wiener, supra note 27, at 237-41. For a listing of
the professional standards which auditors are expected to meet, see supra note 2.
84. Baseless claims can be a problem when a large damage award is sought for the pur-
pose of obtaining a favorable settlement. The costs of investigating and defending these
claims are not insignificant. See Griffin, supra note 65, at 761.
85. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-10 (1975) (summarizing procedural
restrictions applied in negligence actions brought under the 1934 Securities Act).
86. Griffin, supra note 65, at 762.
87. In fact, this is a desired consequence of the reasonable foreseeability standard. H.
Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at _ 461 A.2d at 152.
88. Id.
89. Note, supra note 2, at 780 & n.111.
90. See id. for a discussion of an auditor's liability for non-audit services.
91. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at , 174 N.E. at 448. See supra note 23.
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man. 2 Although the case involved fraud rather than negligence, 93 the ra-
tionale that a client can be barred from pursuing a claim against his
auditor because of his own misconduct is equally applicable in either
instance.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the extension of auditors' liability to reasonably foreseeable
users of the audited financial statements has a seductive logic to it, the
courts should take time to consider the practical ramifications of this
step. Before abandoning the privity defense completely, the courts and
legislatures should consider alternative limiting devices. After all, audi-
tors "cannot be regarded as the guarantors of their client's financial state-
ments or indemnifiers of investor losses. No sensible person would enter
the profession if his risks were so limitless."94
Laurence E. Skinner
92. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982).
93. Cenco Inc., 686 F.2d at 454-56.
94. Griffin, supra note 65, at 762.
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